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THE NONSUPPORT CONTEMPT HEARING: A SURVEY
AND ANALYSIS OF FLORIDA LAW
Ross C. HERING
I. INTRODUCTION
Most courts distinguish between civil and criminal contempt.'
The major import of this distinction is that if the proceeding is
criminal, then a host of constitutional safeguards are afforded the
potential contemnor 2 If the proceeding is civil, then, to accord
with due process, it must be fundamentally fair.3 The danger is
that a nominally civil proceeding may be transformed into what is,
in effect, a criminal trial, thereby denying the contemnor the ap-
propriate level of constitutional safeguards.4
In contempt hearings for nonpayment of child support, the Flor-
ida courts have run afoul of the traditional distinctions between
civil and criminal contempt in several areas:' they speak in terms
of punishment rather than coercion,6 impose determinate rather
than indeterminate sentences in civil proceedings,7 allow the state
to institute civil contempt proceedings,8 and introduce punitive el-
ements into the process whereby a contemnor can be sentenced for
civil contempt when he no longer has the ability to comply.9 In
addition, by using clearly circuitous reasoning, the courts have held
that the indigent contemnor will never have the constitutional
right to counsel in a civil nonsupport contempt hearing.10
The Florida courts have blurred the civil/criminal distinction in
the foregoing areas to the point where civil proceedings are not
fundamentally fair, and in some instances are indeed being con-
verted into criminal proceedings. This comment will suggest sev-
eral ways to clarify this distinction and will ultimately conclude
that the indigent contemnor must be provided with counsel at the
1. Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183, 235 (1971).
2. Id. at 241-42.
3. See infra note 100 and accompanying text.
4. The Florida courts have recognized that "[ilt is possible to convert civil contempt
proceedings to criminal contempt proceedings after a hearing is commenced." Pugliese v.
Pugliese, 347 So. 2d 422, 426 (Fla. 1977). See also Ponder v. Ponder, 438 So. 2d 541, 543
(Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Robbins v. Robbins, 429 So. 2d 424, 431 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).
5. See Thurman, Contempt For Nonsupport In Florida-Civil Or Criminal Proceeding?,
9 STETSON L. REV. 333 (1980).
6. See Avery v. Sinclair, 15 So. 2d 846, 847 (Fla. 1943).
7. See State ex rel. Trezevant v. McLeod, 170 So. 735, 735-36 (Fla. 1936).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 70-75.
9. See Faircloth v. Faircloth, 339 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 1976).
10. Andrews v. Walton, 428 So. 2d 663, 666 (Fla. 1983).
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outset of all civil nonsupport contempt hearings.
II. TRADITIONAL CIVIL/CRIMINAL DISTINCTIONS
A. Purpose of the Punishment and Type of Sentence Imposed
The United States Supreme Court set forth the distinctions be-
tween civil and criminal contempt in Gompers v. Bucks Stove &
Range Co.11 One distinction arises from the purpose of the punish-
ment. If the purpose is remedial or coercive, the contempt is civil.
If the purpose is punitive and an attempt to vindicate the author-
ity of the court, the contempt is criminal.12
The Gompers Court suggested another factor to be used in de-
termining the nature of the contempt, based upon the type of sen-
tence imposed. If the contempt proceeding is civil, the sentence
should be indeterminate: "until the party performs the required
act." If the contempt proceeding is criminal, then the sentence
should be determinate: imprisonment for a definite term.14
The Florida courts recognized the distinction between civil and
criminal contempts based on the purpose of the punishment in
State ex rel. Trezevant v. McLeod.15 In this civil nonsupport hear-
ing, the trial court found the defendant in contempt for refusal to
abide by the support order and imposed an indeterminate sen-
tence, imprisoning him "until he complies with the order of the
court." 16
The trial court did not make an affirmative finding that the de-
ll. 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
Contempts are neither wholly civil nor altogether criminal .... It is not the fact
of punishment but rather its character and purpose that often serve to distinguish
between the two classes of cases. If it is for civil contempt the punishment is re-
medial, and for the benefit of the complainant. But if it is for criminal contempt
the sentence is punitive, to vindicate the authority of the court ...
[Imprisonment for civil contempt is ordered where the defendant has refused to
do an affirmative act required by the provisions of an order which, either in form
or substance, was mandatory in its character. Imprisonment in such cases is not
inflicted as a punishment, but is intended to be remedial by coercing the defen-
dant to do what he had refused to do. The decree in such cases is that the defen-
dant stand committed unless and until he performs the affirmative act required by
the court's order.
Id. at 441-42.
12. Dobbs, supra note 1, at 239.
13. Gompers, 221 U.S. at 443.
14. Id. at 442-43; see also Fink, Basic Issues in Civil Contempt, 8 N.M.L. REV. 55, 61
(1977-78).
15. 170 So. 735 (Fla. 1936).
16. Id.
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fendant had the current ability to comply. If the defendant did not
in fact have the ability to pay, the sentence would in effect be a
punishment for failure to comply with the court's order, rather
than a measure designed to coerce the defendant into paying.17
The supreme court, due to the lack of such a finding, interpreted
the trial court's sentence as being punitive in nature and therefore
held that an indefinite sentence could not be imposed as punish-
ment for past noncompliance with the court's orders.18
Subsequent Florida nonsupport cases have correctly held, in line
with the general rule articulated in Gompers, that when the pur-
pose is to punish for past noncompliance the sentence must be for
a definite term of imprisonment. In Avery v. Sinclair,9 the Florida
Supreme Court stated:
The law is well settled in this state that where a contempt order
is predicated on a finding of past noncompliance with a court or-
der, and not on any present failure to comply therewith although
able so to do, the order, being in its nature a punishment for what
the contemnor has heretofore done, must specify a definite term
of imprisonment.20
The trial court in Avery made the same mistake as the trial
court in Trezevant by failing to make an affirmative finding that
the contemnor possessed the present ability to pay. Yet the trial
court implicitly found that the defendant had the ability to com-
ply, because it gave him the opportunity to obtain his release by
paying the support arrearages. 2 ' The supreme court, however, did
not address the lack of a finding of ability to comply. As a result of
this failure to state the grounds for its ruling, the fact that the
court required a determinate sentence in this case could be read to
hold that all indeterminate sentences are invalid.
In Satterfield v. Satterfield,22 the Florida Supreme Court over-
turned an indeterminate sentence imposed by the trial court de-
spite the fact that the trial court made an affirmative finding of
ability to pay as required by Trezevant. The supreme court first
stated the general rule that the court has the power to punish for
17. See supra note 4.
18. Trezevant, 170 So. at 735-36.
19. 15 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 1943).
20. Id. at 847.
21. Id. at 846.
22. 39 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 1949).
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contempt by imposing determinate sentences.23 It then acknowl-
edged that the sentence was in this case determinate and went on
to overturn the trial court's finding that Mr. Satterfield "willfully
refused to comply . . . 'although financially able to do so.' "24 The
court did not object to the inconsistency of finding a current abil-
ity to comply, which is the necessary predicate to imposing a coer-
cive, indeterminate sentence, and yet imposing a determinate sen-
tence. The lack of clarity emanating from Satterfield and Avery as
to the distinction between the purpose of the proceeding, whether
for civil or criminal contempt, and the type of sentence to be im-
posed in either case sets the groundwork for later cases to establish
the rule that all contempt sentences must be determinate, regard-
less of the nature of the proceeding.25
The civil/criminal distinction was clarified somewhat in Deme-
tree v. State ex rel. Marsh.26 James Demetree was operating a
house of prostitution in his Miami hotel, which prompted the
county solicitor to institute an action against him under the Flor-
ida nuisance statute. The trial court issued a temporary injunction
against Demetree, which he refused to obey. The solicitor sought a
rule nisi, alleging that Demetree had violated the order and re-
questing that he be held in contempt. Demetree appealed to the
supreme court. The court first determined that the proceeding was
for criminal contempt. Following the traditional guidelines of
Gompers,27 the court stated:
In its broadest aspects a civil contempt order is sought by a party
to the cause and entered by the court for the private benefit of
the offended party. While imprisonment may be adjudged in a
civil contempt proceeding, it is coercive rather than punitive in
nature. Customarily when imprisonment is ordered for a civil
contempt its continuance is made contingent upon compliance
with the order of the court and when the contemnor has so com-
plied he is released from prison. The sentence is usually there-
fore indefinite and not for a fixed term. It is for this reason that
in civil contempt it has been said that the contemnor "carries the
key of his prison in his own pocket." . He can end the sentence
23. Id. at 73.
24. Id.
25. See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
26. 89 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 1956).
27. The court made direct reference to Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S.
418 (1911), as precedent, thus firmly establishing the Gompers opinion as the definitive
authority on contempt issues in Florida. Demetree, 89 So. 2d at 502-03.
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and discharge himself at any moment by doing what he had pre-
viously refused to do.
In a civil contempt proceeding an offended party to the cause is
primarily seeking relief, personal and private to himself, as distin-
guished from punishment for conduct offensive to the public or
disrespectful to the court and its authority. On the other hand, a
contempt proceeding criminal in nature is instituted solely and
simply to vindicate the authority of the court or otherwise punish
for conduct offensive to the public in violation of an order of the
court. Customarily when imprisonment is ordered it is generally
for a fixed term and is administered as punishment for an act
committed rather than as coercion to compel the contemnor to do
something which he has theretofore failed and refused to do."8
It may be argued that a civil sentence for a given period of time,
with the contemnor being able to discharge the sentence and ob-
tain his release if he pays the amounts owed, is an "indefinite sen-
tence" and not for a "fixed term" as contrasted with a sixty-day
sentence with no possibility of reducing the sentence by complying
with the court's order. However, the traditional indefinite sentence
has not been defined in this manner. Instead, it has been a sen-
tence without a dated term of imprisonment-simply "until he
complies with the order of the court.""
The supreme court in Demetree found that because the proceed-
ing was instituted by a government official, rather than a private
party, and the redress sought was for a public as opposed to a pri-
vate wrong, the proceeding was for criminal contempt.3 0 As such,
the determinate sentence of six months' imprisonment without op-
portunity for release, even if the nuisance was abated, was
upheld.3 1
Although Demetree did much to clarify the basic distinction be-
tween civil and criminal contempt proceedings, the Florida district
28. Demetree, 89 So. 2d at 501 (citation omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting In re
Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 451, 461 (8th Cir. 1901)).
29. See, e.g., Gompers, 221 U.S. at 442: "The decree in such cases is that the defendant
stand committed unless and until he performs the affirmative act required by the court's
order." (emphasis added). See also Dobbs, supra note 1, at 266. If the trier of fact misjudges
the contemnor's ability to comply, "that misjudgment can result in a literally interminable
jail sentence."
30. Demetree, 89 So. 2d at 502. This distinction, based on who instituted the action and
for whose benefit it was brought, was yet another test proposed by the Court in Gompers for
use in making the civil/criminal distinction. See Dobbs, supra note 1, at 239. See also infra
notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
31. Demetree, 89 So. 2d at 502.
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courts of appeal have had difficulty in applying the holdings of the
pre-Demetree cases. One such decision was issued by the First Dis-
trict Court of Appeal in State ex rel. Byrd v. Anderson.32 The trial
court found Mr. Anderson in contempt for failure to make child
support payments and as punishment sentenced him to jail "until
such time as the defendant has paid all support payments due and
owing under the orders of this Court.""3
In its opinion, the First District reiterated the rule that all con-
tempt sentences must be determinate.3 4 The court reached this
conclusion by relying on a passage from Satterfield:35 "Our adjudi-
cations are uniform in holding that a court has the power to pun-
ish for contempt a refusal to obey any legal order, mandate or de-
cree of a court, but the term of imprisonment must be definite and
certain."' 6 This rule would be correct if indeed the trial court was
trying to punish the defendant. However, it is not at all clear that
this was the trial judge's motive. The sentence was that Mr. An-
derson was to be held in jail until he complied with the order of
the court. This is the indeterminate sentence typical of the coer-
cive civil contempt. The court could just as easily have overturned
the sentence because of the lack of an affirmative finding of the
defendant's ability to pay, as was done in Avery v. Sinclair.3 7
Nowhere in the opinion did the appellate court state that this
was a criminal proceeding, or that the rules of criminal procedure
were followed. In fact, the court cited as another deficiency in the
trial court's ruling the fact that it failed to recognize "the rule es-
tablished in Florida that in a case of civil contempt the contemnor
'carries the key of his prison in his own pocket.' ,s This clearly
implies that the proceeding was one for civil rather than criminal
contempt. Yet the court spoke in terms of punishing the contem-
nor. The result was that a criminal-determinate sentence was or-
dered in a civil proceeding in direct contravention of the distinc-
tion noted in Gompers and adopted by the Florida courts in
Demetree.
A further example of the confusion surrounding this area is
32. 168 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964).
33. Id. at 555.
34. Id.: "Fortunately for the petitioner's position, the appellate courts of Florida have
uniformly held that the term of imprisonment for contempt of court must be definite and
certain."
35. 39 So. 2d 72, 74 (Fla. 1949).
36. Byrd, 168 So. 2d at 555 (emphasis added).
37. 15 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 1943).
38. Byrd, 168 So. 2d at 556 (quoting Demetree, 89 So. 2d at 501).
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Grotnes v. Grotnes.39 In Grotnes, the Fourth District Court of Ap-
peal held that an indeterminate sentence imposed for failure to
pay support arrearages was void for indefiniteness.4 0 The trial
court, however, did not speak in terms of punishment for past non-
compliance with the court's orders for which a determinate sen-
tence is appropriate, but instead included a provision whereby the
contemnor could avoid being imprisoned by complying with the or-
der of the court."1 If the contemnor did not comply, he was to be
imprisoned until he did so.42 This was clearly a civil contempt,
with the classic coercive-indeterminate sentence. In contrast to the
trial court, the court of appeal included references to punishment
without specifying whether the proceeding was civil or criminal, or
what type of procedures had been followed.43 When the general
rule in Florida, that nonsupport contempt proceedings are deemed
civil in nature, is taken into account, it appears the court may al-
low, and indeed might require, that a determinate sentence be im-
posed in a nominally civil proceeding as punishment for past non-
compliance when the contemnor has not enjoyed the benefit of the
appropriate constitutional safeguards."
The Florida Supreme Court has implicitly upheld the result
reached in Byrd and Grotnes with its decisions in Pugliese v. Pug-
liese45 and Faircloth v. Faircloth." In both nonsupport cases, the
trial court imposed determinate sentences of imprisonment. 7
While overruling other aspects of the cases,' 8 the supreme court
39. 338 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976).
40. Id. at 1126. "In the past similar orders sentencing an offender to imprisonment for
an indefinite and indeterminate period, or until he pays past due alimony. . ., have consist-
ently been held void for indefiniteness and uncertainty." Id. (citing Byrd, Satterfield and
Avery).
41. This is referred to as a purge provision and was made mandatory in civil trials by
Faircloth v. Faircloth, 339 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 1976).
42. Grotnes, 338 So. 2d at 1124-25.
43. "As a general rule, the power to punish for contempt rests with the court con-
temned." Id. at 1125 (emphasis added). "In this instance it was the Georgia court which was
contemned, and it is beyond the power of the Florida court to punish for this contempt."
Id. at 1125-26 (emphasis added).
44. See Faircloth v. Faircloth, 339 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 1976). See also Deter v. Deter, 353
So. 2d 614 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
45. 347 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 1977) (requiring that there be a purge provision in any civil
contempt sentence).
46. 339 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 1976) (requiring a finding by the trial court that the contemnor
has the present ability to comply with the court's order and willfully refuses to do so).
47. Mr. Pugliese was sentenced for 13 days and Mr. Faircloth for five months and 29
days.
48. Failure to include a purge provision, Pugliese, 347 So. 2d at 426; and failure to make
an affirmative finding of ability to pay, Faircloth, 339 So. 2d at 651.
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did not overturn the imposition of the determinate sentences." As
a result of these decisions, the Florida courts are in direct conflict
with the traditional rule of enforcing civil contempt with indeter-
minate sentences and criminal contempt with determinate
sentences."
The civil/criminal distinction is further clouded by the introduc-
tion of a punitive element into the civil contempt law in Florida. In
this state, a defendant can be held in civil contempt when: (1) he
has the ability to comply with the court order but willfully refuses
to do so, or (2) he had the ability to comply with the order when it
was originally issued, but subsequently divested himself of that
ability through his own fault or neglect designed to frustrate the
intent and purpose of the order." Under this rule, the court must
first determine whether the defendant has the current ability to
comply.52 The problem here is that if the court determines that he
does have the ability but in fact he does not, then in effect the
court is sentencing the contemnor as punishment" and converting
the proceeding into a criminal one. 4
The more serious problem is raised by the fact that in Florida
defendants can be held in contempt when they no longer have the
ability to comply.5 5 In such a case, there is nothing left to coerce,
and the defendants can no longer be said to "carry the keys of
their prison in their own pockets. '56 The motive in sentencing the
contemnor to prison, therefore, is purely punitive and is designed
"to vindicate the authority of the court." 7 This contempt would
49. In Pugliese the court described the nature of the civil contempt sentence as "usually
indefinite and not for a fixed term," 347 So. 2d at 424, and yet objected only to the lack of a
purge provision.
It may be argued that including a purge provision will somehow make the sentence indefi-
nite, but the fact remains that if the defendant either refuses to pay, or does not have the
ability, under the Pugliese rule, he will remain in jail for a fixed sentence, rather than "until
he performs the requested act" as the Supreme Court noted in Gompers.
50. See supra text accompanying notes 13-14.
51. Faircloth, 339 So. 2d at 651.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 652 (citing Faircloth v. Faircloth, 321 So. 2d 87, 93 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)
(Smith, J., dissenting)). See also Dobbs, supra note 1, at 266, 272.
54. See Pugliese, 347 So. 2d at 426; see also Sword v. Sword, 249 N.W.2d 88, 98 (Mich.
1976).
55. Faircloth, 339 So. 2d at 651.
56. In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461 (8th Cir. 1902).
57. Gompers, 221 U.S. at 441.
[I]f the defendant does that which he has been commanded not to do [divest him-
self of the ability to comply], the disobedience is a thing accomplished. Imprison-
ment cannot undo or remedy what has been done nor afford any compensation for
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be classified as criminal under the traditional purpose of the pun-
ishment test." Indeed, under Florida law the same result should
arguably be reached. 59
The United States Supreme Court, in Shillitani v. United
States,60 held that "the justification for coercive imprisonment as
applied to civil contempt depends upon the ability of the contem-
nor to comply with the court's order.""1 This applies even though
the contemnor had the ability to comply at the time of the original
order and subsequently divested himself of that ability. 2 The rule
the pecuniary injury caused by the disobedience. If the sentence is limited to im-
prisonment for a definite period, the defendant is furnished no key, and he cannot
shorten the term by promising not to repeat the offense. Such imprisonment oper-
ates not as a remedy coercive in its nature, but solely as punishment for the com-
pleted act of disobedience.
Id. at 442-43 (emphasis added).
58. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. See also Barrett v. Barrett, 368 A.2d 616,
621 (Pa. 1977): "[T]o condition a person's avoidance of or release from imprisonment on his
performing acts beyond his power to perform is in effect to convert a coercive sentence into
a penal one without the safeguards of criminal procedure .... "
59. See Demetree, 89 So. 2d at 501: In criminal proceedings, "when imprisonment is
ordered it is generally for a fixed term and is administered as punishment for an act com-
mitted rather than as coercion to compel the contemnor to do something which he has
theretofore failed and refused to do." Here the act is already committed and there is noth-
ing left to coerce. Hence, the Florida courts are imposing punitive sentences in what are
nominally civil trials. See also Bowen v. Bowen, No. 83-446 (Fla. 2d DCA Jan. 25, 1984); and
Ponder v. Ponder, 438 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), wherein the court reviewed the Fair-
cloth rule:
[W]hile the language in Faircloth suggests that a person can be found in contempt
if he has intentionally disposed of his financial resources to avoid compliance with
the order, even though he does not have a present ability to comply with the court
order, according to Demetree, Pugliese, Andrews, and Robbins, such person can-
not be committed to jail unless there is also an affirmative finding based upon
evidence in the record that at the time of incarceration the contemnor has the
ability to make payment of the purge amount. Anything less removes the "key to
his cell" from the contemnor's pocket, operates to punish rather than coerce pro-
spective compliance with the court's order, and transforms the proceeding from
one for civil contempt to one for criminal contempt, thereby requiring full compli-
ance with Rule 3.840, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, and other due process
requirements applicable to trial and punishment for criminal contempts.
Id. at 543.
60. 384 U.S. 364 (1966).
61. Id. at 371 (citing Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56 (1948)).
62. In Maggio, the Court held that a bankruptcy court, in a civil proceeding, cannot hold
the defendant in contempt where he does not currently have the ability to comply, even
though he had the ability at the date of the turnover order. "[T]o jail one for a contempt for
omitting an act he is powerless to perform would . . . make the proceeding purely punitive,
to describe it charitably." 333 U.S. at 72. In Shillitani, the Court stated that where a grand
jury has been discharged, a witness who refused to testify "can no longer be confined since
he then has no further opportunity to purge himself of contempt." 384 U.S. at 371.
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in Florida63 is in direct conflict with this position, and as such
raises serious questions about the constitutionality of this state's
law. As stated earlier, where the purpose of the proceeding is puni-
tive, this implies a criminal contempt. This in turn requires that
the contemnor be afforded a host of constitutional safeguards not
required in the civil proceeding.
The Florida courts invite federal review by conducting nominally
civil proceedings without these safeguards where the purpose is to
punish the contemnor for intentional frustration of the court's or-
der. This result can easily be avoided by instituting criminal rather
than civil proceedings when such a purpose is anticipated.'
4
B. Institution and Benefit of the Proceeding: State v. Private
Party
Another distinction between civil and criminal contempt is
based upon who institutes the proceeding, and for whose benefit it
is brought." The test was developed in Gompers" and followed by
the Florida Supreme Court in Demetree. 7 In Demetree, the court
stated, "Usually a criminal contempt proceeding is brought in the
name of the public or in behalf of the public while a civil contempt
proceeding is brought in the name of an individual party seeking
redress for a personal wrong committed against him in violation of
a court's decree.""
In Florida, a divorced parent who seeks aid for a dependent
child must, as a condition of receiving that aid, have instituted a
civil action against any person obligated for support of the depen-
dent children.9 Furthermore, the Department of Health and Re-
habilitative Services (HRS) is directed to assist a parent in insti-
tuting the proceedings to enforce these support obligations.70
63. See supra text accompanying notes 51 & 55.
64. See Thurman, supra note 5, at 344.
65. See Dobbs, supra note 1, at 239.
66. 221 U.S. at 444-45. See also Dobbs, supra note 1, at 239.
67. 89 So. 2d at 501-02.
68. Id.
69. FLA. STAT. § 409.245 (1983) provides in part:
No application to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services for any
aid to dependent children which is within its power to grant shall be approved
unless such applicant shall have instituted in the proper court, and in good faith
prosecutes, a civil action for support from persons liable for the support of appli-
cant's dependent child as the case may be, whenever such cause of action exists.
The department shall assist applicants in bringing proceedings to enforce support
by such persons who may be liable for the support under the laws of this state.
70. Id.
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Section 409.245, Florida Statutes provides in part:
Such assistance shall be by consultation and arrangements with
legal aid societies and bureaus established by local bar associa-
tions, if there be such legal aid societies able and willing to act;
otherwise, the state attorney of the circuit in which such county
is located shall institute and prosecute such action.7
Furthermore, section 409.2561(3) provides in part that:
By accepting public assistance for, or on behalf of, a dependent
child, [the parent] is deemed to have made an assignment to the
department of any right, title, and interest in any child support
obligation owed to or for that child. . . . The recipient is also
deemed to have appointed [HRS] as his attorney in fact to act in
his name, place, and stead to perform specific acts relating to
child support, including but not limited to: . . .
(c) Pursuing civil and criminal enforcement of support
obligations.72
In addition, the statement of legislative intent behind these stat-
utory provisions makes it clear that these actions are brought on
behalf of the public, rather than for the individual's benefit.7 3
In summary, the actions instituted by HRS are brought in the
name of the state, may be tried by the state attorney or an attor-
71. Id. (emphasis added).
72. FLA. STAT. § 409.2561(3) (1983).
73. FLA. STAT. § 409.2551 (1983).
Legislative intent.
Common-law and statutory procedures governing the remedies for enforcement
of support for financially dependent children by responsible parents have not
proven sufficiently effective or efficient to cope with the increasing incidence of
financial dependency. The increasing workload of courts, prosecuting attorneys,
and the Attorney General has resulted in a growing burden on the financial re-
sources of the state, which is constrained to provide public assistance for basic
maintenance requirements when parents fail to meet their primary obligations.
The state, therefore, exercising its police and sovereign powers, declares that the
common-law and statutory remedies pertaining to family desertion and nonsup-
port of dependent children shall be augmented by additional remedies directed to
the resources of the responsible parents. In order to render resources more imme-
diately available to meet the needs of dependent children, it is the legislative in-
tent that the remedies provided herein are in addition to, and not in lieu of, ex-
isting remedies. It is declared to be the public policy of this state that this act be
construed and administered to the end that children shall be maintained from the
resources of responsible parents, thereby relieving, at least in part, the burden
presently borne by the general citizenry through public assistance programs.
Id. (emphasis added).
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ney for HRS, a state agency, and are for the purpose of "relieving
* * * the burden presently borne by the general citizenry. '74 As
such, these proceedings must, under the guidelines announced in
Gompers and followed in Demetree, be deemed to be for criminal
contempt. 78
While Demetree7  Faircloth7 and Pugliese78 together outline
the theoretical distinction between civil and criminal proceedings,
the Florida courts continue to blur, if not obliterate, the distinc-
tion in their decisions and in so doing risk offending the constitu-
tional rights of contemnors. What is needed is both clarity of pur-
pose and of application: If the purpose is to punish, then this is
clearly a criminal proceeding79 which should be instituted by the
state,80 conducted under the rules of criminal procedure, 1 and re-
sult in a determinate sentence being imposed.2 In contrast, if the
purpose is to coerce, the action should be initiated by the private
party,83 conducted according to the rules of civil procedure, and
carry an indeterminate sentence based on an affirmative finding of
ability to pay at the date of the sentence,8 5 which is subject to a
purge provision. In either case, the order should clearly state its
purpose-either to coerce or to punish. Furthermore, a determi-
nate sentence should never be imposed where criminal procedures
have not been followed.8 7 Strict adherence to the traditional guide-
lines outlined above would do much to lessen the confusion ex-
isting in this area and would diminish the possibility of Florida's
contempt law being declared unconstitutional upon review by the
federal courts.
III. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The preceding section examined the technical distinctions be-
74. Id.
75. See generally Brotzman v. Brotzman, 283 N.W.2d 600 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979).
76. 89 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 1956).
77. 339 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 1976).
78. 347 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 1977).
79. Demetree, 89 So. 2d at 501.
80. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
81. Pugliese, 347 So. 2d at 424.
82. Trezevant, 170 So. at 735-36.
83. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
84. Pugliese, 347 So. 2d at 422.
85. Faircloth, 339 So. 2d at 651.
86. Pugliese, 347 So. 2d at 425.
87. Dobbs, supra note 1, at 246; see also Fink, supra note 14, at 60.
NONSUPPORT CONTEMPT HEARING
tween civil and criminal contempts in an effort to clarify the dis-
tinction and identify the type of contempts being imposed. Beyond
their effect upon the procedures which must be utilized and the
type of sentences which should be imposed in each type of pro-
ceeding, the factors underlying this distinction have serious impli-
cations for the contemnor's right to counsel. Although the civil/
criminal distinction should no longer be dispositive of this right, it
has served as the historical basis from which the right has evolved.
The development by the federal and state courts of the right to
counsel and its application to the Florida nonsupport contempt
hearing is the subject of the remainder of this comment.
A. Sixth Amendment/Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Analysis
The sixth amendment of the United States Constitution gives an
accused the right to counsel in criminal proceedings.88 This right
was construed by the United States Supreme Court in Powell v.
Alabama.89 There it was held that the state must appoint counsel
for indigent deferidants in capital cases.90 In noncapital cases, the
Court initially allowed states to adopt an ad hoc, case-by-case de-
termination of whether the defendant had a right to counsel,91 but
this was later overruled in Gideon v. Wainwright.92 In Argersinger
88. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.., to have the Assis-
tance of Counsel for his defence.". U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
89. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
90. Id. at 71. While the Court's holding was limited to capital cases where the defendant
is unable to afford counsel and is incapable of defending himself, the opinion was broadly
written and has served as the basis on which later courts have relied in extending the right
to counsel. See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31 (1972).
Justice Sutherland in Powell summed up the position of the Court:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not com-
prehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated lay-
man has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. . . .He is unfamiliar
with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial
without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence
irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he [may] have a perfect
one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings
against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction
because he does not know how to establish his innocence. If that be true of men of
intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or those of
feeble intellect.
287 U.S. at 68-69.
91. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 471-73 (1942).
92. 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963). The Court in Gideon overturned the assumption of Betts v.
Brady that the sixth amendment guarantee to counsel was not a fundamental right: "[Tihe
19841
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v. Hamlin,93 the Court adopted the rule that the right to appointed
counsel exists in all criminal cases where an indigent defendant is
faced with possible incarceration. 4 This holding was subsequently
limited in Scott v. Illinois to apply only to those cases where ac-
tual imprisonment occurs.
9 5
Courts which have rejected the right to counsel in civil contempt
hearings have done so largely on the ground that the sixth amend-
ment, as incorporated to the states, applies only to criminal
cases. e Since Argersinger and Scott were criminal cases, the courts
theorize that their rationale does not extend to civil proceedings.
9 7
While the United States Supreme Court has not reached the ex-
act issue presented by the nonsupport hearings, recent opinions
have shown that the right to counsel is not limited solely to crimi-
right to the aid of counsel is of this fundamental character." Id. at 342-43 (citing Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. at 68).
Again, in sweeping language the Court stated, "[A]ny person haled into court, who is too
poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This
seems to us to be an obvious truth." 372 U.S. at 344.
93. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
94. "We hold, therefore, that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person-may be
imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he
was represented by counsel at his trial." Id. at 37.
Absent from the above is any statement limiting its applicability solely to criminal trials.
Relying on this passage, several state and federal courts have found the right to counsel
exists in civil trials where imprisonment actually results. See United States v. Bobart Travel
Agency, Inc., 699 F.2d 618 (2d Cir. 1983) (failure to produce tax records); In re Kilgo, 484
F.2d 1215 (4th Cir. 1973) (failure to answer grand jury questions); Young v. Whitworth, 522
F. Supp. 759 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Otton v. Zaborac, 525 P.2d 537 (Alaska 1974); Common-
wealth ex rel. Brown v. Hendrick, 283 A.2d 722 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1971). See also Henkel v.
Bradshaw, 483 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1973) (recognizing the right to counsel but withholding
decision, per Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), until after exhaustion of state court
remedies); Chase v. Chase, 413 A.2d 208 (Md. 1980) (dissent argues for right to counsel in a
strong opinion); Ex parte Wilson, 559 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (dicta supports
right to counsel).
95. 440 U.S. 367 (1979). "[W]e believe that the central premise of Argersinger-that
actual imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere threat of imprison-
ment-is eminently sound and warrants adoption of actual imprisonment as the line defin-
ing the constitutional right to appointment of counsel." Id. at 373.
96. See supra note 88. Curiously, it has been the state courts, interpreting a federal
constitutional right, which have declined to extend the right to counsel to the civil nonsup-
port hearing. See, e.g., Andrews v. Walton, 428 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1983); Meyer v. Meyer, 414
A.2d 236 (Me. 1980); Duval v. Duval, 322 A.2d 1 (N.H. 1974); Jolly v. Wright, 265 S.E.2d
135 (N.C. 1980); In re Calhoun, 350 N.E.2d 665 (Ohio 1976).
The federal courts, however, have been unanimous in upholding the right to counsel when
faced with the issue presented here. See supra note 94 and infra note 117.
97. These holdings overlook the sweeping language of Gideon and Argersinger, and the
strong precedent from the state and federal courts which discredits the distinction. See
supra notes 92-94.
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nal proceedings." Lassiter v. Department of Social Services put
an end to the bright-line civil/criminal distinction.9 In this paren-
tal rights termination case, the Court did not end its examination
of the right to counsel with the conclusion that sixth amendment
guarantees apply only to criminal cases. Instead, the Court found
that the proceedings must be governed by what is necessary to en-
sure fundamental fairness according to the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment.100
The leading case of Matthews v. Eldridge"'0 set out three dis-
tinct factors to be weighed in evaluating the due process
requirements: 102
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such inter-
est through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any,
of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substi-
tute procedural requirement would entail.10 3
Applying these factors, the Court in Lassiter first looked to the
nature of the interest involved. Although the Court acknowledged
that the person has an "extremely important" interest in his or her
child,104 this interest was not found to be as great as where the
defendant himself faced possible deprivation of liberty. 05 The pri-
vate interest was then balanced against the state's interest and the
nature of the proceeding. The Court concluded that these factors
98. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (prisoner facing transfer to a mental hospital
was entitled to counsel); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (15-year-old boy entitled to counsel
in juvenile delinquency proceeding).
99. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
100. That it is the defendant's interest in personal freedom, and not simply the
special Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments right to counsel in criminal cases,
which triggers the right to appointed counsel is demonstrated by the Court's an-
nouncement in In re Gault . . ., that the "Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires that in respect of proceedings to determine delinquency
which may result in commitment to an institution in which the juvenile's freedom
is curtailed," the juvenile has a right to appointed counsel even though proceed-
ings may be styled "civil" and not "criminal."
Id. at 25 (citation omitted) (emphasis added and omitted).
101. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
102. These factors were made the basis of the due process test in Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471 (1972) and were applied again in Lassiter.
103. Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335.
104. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31.
105. Id.
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did not justify the appointment of counsel in every parental termi-
nation hearing but recognized that these factors would not always
be given the same weight in every proceeding. 06 As such, the Court
adopted a case-by-case approach to the right to counsel in a paren-
tal termination proceeding. 0 7
The right to counsel in nonsupport contempt hearings was re-
viewed by the Florida Supreme Court in Andrews v. Walton.0 8 In
Andrews, the court purported to review the requirements of due
process; however, it appears that the court was more concerned
with the traditional civil/criminal distinction and its effect upon
the right to counsel.
The court first stated that fundamental fairness, as interpreted
in Lassiter,0 9 creates the presumption that an indigent has the
right to counsel only if he faces imprisonment. 0 The court ac-
knowledged that the defendant faced imprisonment and yet did
not stop at this point; it went on to explain the traditional distinc-
tions between civil and criminal contempts."' The court concluded
that the sixth amendment applies to criminal contempt proceed-
ings because of the punitive nature of the proceeding, while in civil
contempt proceedings fundamental fairness will be satisfied be-
cause the defendant has the ability to control the sentence by com-
plying with the order of the court." 2 The above distinction as to
the purpose of the proceeding, whether it is punitive or coercive, is
used to determine whether the proceeding is criminal or civil." 3
Once this distinction has been made, the question still remains
whether counsel is to be provided. If the proceeding is criminal,
the right to counsel exists because of the possibility of imprison-
106. If, in a given case, the parent's interests were at their strongest, the State's
interests were at their weakest, and the risks of error were at their peak, it could
not be said that the Eldridge factors did not overcome the presumption against
the right to appointed counsel, and that due process did not therefore require the
appointment of counsel. But since the Eldridge factors will not always be so dis-
tributed, . . . neither can we say that the Constitution requires the appointment
of counsel in every parental termination proceeding.
Id. (citation omitted).
107. Id. at 31-32. Taking note of the fact that many states do require appointment of
counsel in parental termination cases, the Court went on to state, "The Court's opinion
today in no way implies that the standards increasingly urged by informed public opinion
and now widely followed by the States are other than enlightened and wise." Id. at 34.
108. 428 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1983).
109. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
110. Andrews, 428 So. 2d at 665.
111. Id. at 665-66.
112. Id. at 666.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 11-12.
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ment, not because of the punitive nature of the proceeding. 14 If
the trial is civil, then the due process guarantee of fundamental
fairness applies, and the proceeding must be analyzed under the
standards of Matthews v. Eldridge.1 15
By including this traditional punitive/coercive distinction be-
tween criminal and civil contempt, the Florida Supreme Court in
Andrews appears to be reverting to the historical distinction be-
tween the two as to the right to counsel.1 6 Several state and fed-
eral courts have dropped this distinction as dispositive of the right
to counsel.11 7 Indeed, the court in Andrews cited to an earlier Flor-
ida case, In re D.B.,118 which reviewed the right to counsel in de-
pendency determination proceedings. There the court stated:
[T]he right to counsel . . .applies only in criminal cases and
flows principally from the sixth amendment right to counsel, ap-
plied to the states through the fourteenth amendment, rather
than from the fourteenth amendment due process guarantee.
114. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979). "[T]he Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution require only that no indigent criminal de-
fendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the State has afforded him the right
to assistance of appointed counsel in his defense." Id. See also Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 25-27.
115. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 25-27.
116. The right to counsel exists only in criminal trials. This distinction was thoroughly
discredited in Lassiter. Id. at 25.
117. The federal courts have upheld the right to counsel in a variety of civil cases. For
instance, in United States v. Anderson, 553 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1977), the court upheld the
right to counsel in a contempt hearing for failure to produce tax records. "Deprivation of
liberty has the same effect on the confined person regardless of whether the proceeding is
civil or criminal in nature." Id. at 1156. The same result has been reached where the con-
temnor has refused to answer grand jury questions, In re Di Bella, 518 F.2d 955 (2d Cir.
1975); see also United States v. Sun Kung Kang, 468 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1972); and where
defendant has refused to produce documents for the grand jury, In re Rosahn, 671 F.2d 690
(2d Cir. 1982).
On the exact issue considered here, the federal courts have again upheld the indigent's
right to counsel, notwithstanding the civil/criminal distinction. See Mastin v. Fellerhoff, 526
F. Supp. 969 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (it is the fourteenth amendment due process clause which
controls the right to counsel, not the civil/criminal distinction).
Various state courts have also rejected the distinction as determinative of the right to
counsel. See Ex parte Wilson, 559 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (recognizing that in
Texas, all contempt proceedings, whether civil or criminal, are criminal in nature); Otton v.
Zaborac, 525 P.2d 537 (Alaska 1974); In re Harris, 72 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1968); McNabb v.
Osmundson, 315 N.W.2d 9 (Iowa 1982); Rutherford v. Rutherford, 464 A.2d 228 (Md. 1983);
State ex rel. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Rael, 642 P.2d 1099 (N.M. 1982); State ex rel. Amen-
dola v. Jackson, 346 N.Y.S.2d 353 (Sup. Ct. 1973); Tetro v. Tetro, 544 P.2d 17 (Wash. 1975);
Smoot v. Dingess, 236 S.E.2d 468 (W. Va. 1977). See also Padilla v. Padilla, 645 P.2d 1327
(Colo. Ct. App. 1982). See generally Brotzman v. Brotzman, 283 N.W.2d 600 (Wis. Ct. App.
1979).
118. 385 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1980).
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Right to counsel in dependency proceedings, on the other hand, is
governed by due process considerations, rather than the sixth
amendment." 9
While it is clear from the rest of the court's opinion that the provi-
sions of counsel should be governed by what is necessary to comply
with due process, the statement that "the right to counsel applies
only in criminal cases" is indicative of the court's underlying aver-
sion to extending the right to counsel in civil trials.
The presumption of Lassiter, that the indigent is entitled to
counsel only if he faces imprisonment, was rebutted in Andrews by
the court's determination that the Faircloth rule'20 satisfied the
fundamental requirement of due process.
In that case, we held that, to satisfy due process, a person could
not be adjudicated guilty of failing to pay alimony or child sup-
port and sentenced to imprisonment conditional upon payment
unless the trial court finds that the person (1) has the ability to
make the payments; and (2) willfully refuses to pay. Conse-
quently, if the requirements of Faircloth are met, an indigent
parent cannot be imprisoned for failure to pay child support be-
cause, upon a showing of indigency, the trial court cannot make
the essential finding that the parent indigent has the ability to
pay. Since the parent who is unable to acquire the funds neces-
sary to purge himself will not be subject to imprisonment in non-
support civil contempt proceedings, "fundamental fairness" is
satisfied and due process does not give rise to the right to ap-
pointed counsel. 2 '
This rationale fails to grasp the time at which the provision of
counsel is most important-before the determination of indigency.
If the defendant loses on the underlying issue of ability to pay,
then, contrary to the court's suggestion, the contemnor will be de-
prived of his physical liberty. Therefore, the presumption of
Lassiter must apply. The risk that the defendant will be errone-
ously found to have the ability to pay, thereby effectively con-
verting the proceeding into a criminal trial, 22 is precisely the risk
119. Id. at 89 (emphasis added).
120. If the contemnor is unable to comply with the court's order he cannot be impris-
oned for contempt. Faircloth v. Faircloth, 339 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 1976).
121. Andrews, 428 So. 2d at 666. It should be noted, however, that the Faircloth opinion
makes no mention of fundamental fairness. There the court's analysis was restricted solely
to the nonconstitutional requirements of previous Florida case law.
122. Robbins v. Robbins, 429 So. 2d 424, 431 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). See also Bowen v.
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which counsel is needed to protect against.
The court's superficial analysis of the due process considerations
in Andrews cannot withstand critical review. While on the surface
the opinion purports to review the due process requirements of
fundamental fairness, it is clear that the court did not conduct the
extensive inquiry into the private interest, the risk of erroneous
deprivation of that interest, and the competing state interest in-
volved in the procedures utilized, required by Matthews v.
Eldridge.12 3
This comment will next apply the Eldridge factors to the non-
support contempt hearing in order to determine whether the Flor-
ida courts are comporting with due process. 12
B. The Matthews v. Eldridge Balancing Test
1. The Private Interest
The individual's interest is that of his personal freedom, other-
wise stated as his "liberty interest." This interest weighs so heavily
as to create the presumption that an indigent litigant has a right to
court appointed counsel when faced with the possibility of impris-
onment. 125 "It is against this presumption that all the other ele-
ments in the due process decision must be measured.' 12 Several
state and federal courts have found the potential contemnor's in-
terest in his personal freedom sufficient to justify the provision of
court appointed counsel for indigents in all nonsupport hearings.127
Other courts have analyzed the liberty interest in an entirely dif-
ferent manner. Their rationale is as follows: Since, theoretically,
civil contempt is coercive only, 28 and civil contemnors virtually
"carry the keys of their prison in their own pockets,"' 9 these
courts reason that the liberty interest involved is not as strong as
Bowen, No. 83-446 (Fla. 2d DCA Jan. 25, 1984).
123. 424 U.S. at 335.
124. For an excellent analysis of the due process considerations, see generally Note, Due
Process in the Civil Nonsupport Proceeding: The Right to Counsel and Alternatives to
Incarceration, 61 TEx. L. REv. 291 (1982).
125. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 26-27.
126. Id. at 27.
127. See, e.g., Mastin v. Fellerhoff, 526 F. Supp. 969 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Young v. Whit-
worth, 522 F. Supp. 759 (S.D. Ohio 1981); McNabb v. Osmundson, 315 N.W.2d 9 (Iowa
1982); State ex rel. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Rael, 642 P.2d 1099 (N.M. 1982).
128. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
129. In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461 (8th Cir. 1902).
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that of the criminal defendants. 130 Support for this rationale can
be derived from the oft-cited civil cases of Morrissey v. Brewer'
3
'
and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 1 2 which adopted a case-by-case determi-
nation of the right to counsel. Morrissey involved a parole revoca-
tion hearing; Gagnon involved a probation violation hearing. In
both cases, the Supreme Court characterized the defendants' lib-
erty interests as conditional and to be distinguished from the undi-
luted interest of the ordinary citizen. 3' What is at risk in the non-
support context, however, is the unconditional, undiminished right
to personal freedom of a defendant who has yet to be adjudged to
have violated any lawful order. If the defendant who is held in con-
tempt does not in fact have the ability to pay, then there is no
question of the violation of a full-fledged liberty interest."
2. The Risk of an Erroneous Deprivation
Several courts have characterized the nonsupport proceedings as
noncomplex, and rarely subject to substantial dispute.135 As such,
they conclude that the risk of an erroneous deprivation is slight."36
In the criminal context, this relative noncomplexity has not de-
terred the courts from requiring counsel to be furnished to the
indigent. 37
130. See, e.g., Meyer v. Meyer, 414 A.2d 236 (Me. 1980); Sword v. Sword, 249 N.W.2d 88
(Mich. 1976); Jolly v. Wright, 265 S.E.2d 135 (N.C. 1980).
131. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
132. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
133. The rationale is that the criminal contemnor has already been sentenced and has
either been put on probation, or has served part of the sentence and been released. As a
result, he has received less severe punishment, subject to revocation for violation of parole
or probation conditions. "Revocation deprives an individual, not of the absolute liberty to
which every citizen is entitled, but only of the conditional liberty properly dependent on
observance of special parole restrictions." Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480.
134. Furthermore, the lack of ability to pay would turn the sentences into criminal ones,
imposed in civil proceedings without the appropriate constitutional safeguards. See Ponder
v. Ponder, 438 So. 2d 541, 543 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Robbins v. Robbins, 429 So. 2d 424, 431
(Fla. 3d DCA 1983).
135. See Sword v. Sword, 249 N.W.2d 88, 93 (Mich. 1976).
136. See Jolly v. Wright, 265 S.E.2d 135, 143 (N.C. 1980).
137. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (indigent criminal defendant
on trial for a noncapital felony held entitled to court appointed counsel); Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (criminal defendant entitled to counsel in all proceedings
which may result in loss of liberty).
The requirement of counsel may well be necessary for a fair trial even in a petty-
offense prosecution. We are by no means convinced that legal and constitutional
questions involved in a case that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief
period are any less complex than when a person can be sent off for six months or
more.
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In Florida, the nature of the proceeding may be the biggest
source of the problem. As suggested earlier, the civil nonsupport
contempt proceeding has several characteristics of a criminal pro-
ceeding. First, the outcome of the determination of ability to com-
ply with the court's order has serious implications for the contem-
nor's constitutional right to counsel. If this determination is
incorrectly made, then, in effect, the court has converted the civil
proceeding into a criminal one. 138
Second, the courts impose a determinate sentence for both civil
and criminal contempt.13 9 Not only does this impose a criminal
sentence in a civil proceeding, but it also makes it difficult for the
appellate courts to ascertain whether the proceeding was in fact
civil or criminal. Therefore, the possibility is reduced that a pro-
ceeding conducted in violation of the sixth amendment and four-
teenth amendment due process (by conducting what is in effect a
criminal proceeding as a nominally civil one and denying the con-
temnor his right to counsel in the process) will be discovered by
the appellate court.
Third, the fact that in Florida a contemnor may be sentenced for
civil contempt as punishment where he willfully divested himself
of the ability to pay14 0 implies that, under the traditional purpose
of the punishment test,"' the proceeding is criminal. Again, in this
instance the contemnor must appear in what is, in effect, a crimi-
nal proceeding without the constitutionally guaranteed benefit of
counsel.
A further problem with the nature of the proceeding is that HRS
is directed to assist the custodial parent seeking state aid in the
institution of proceedings against the noncustodial parent who has
not complied with the support obligations." 2 The fact that the
state institutes a civil proceeding conflicts with the Gompers test
for determining whether the contempt proceeding is civil or
criminal. ' 3
Other jurisdictions faced with this issue have found that when
the accused confronts the great resources of the state, and the
state is itself represented by counsel, the defendant must also be
Id. at 33.
138. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
140. See Faircloth v. Faircloth, 339 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 1976).
141. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
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provided with counsel if he is indigent. "4 Indeed, it was this pit-
ting of the indigent against the state which was of concern to Jus-
tice Black in Gideon v. Wainwright, which first established the
right to counsel in noncapital criminal cases. 145
The recent case of Robbins v. Robbins"" is indicative of the way
nonsupport cases are conducted in Florida. In 1981, the State of
Florida initiated 480 nonsupport contempt actions, from which
this consolidated appeal originated. The actions were brought as
civil contempt proceedings on behalf of the parties seeking to en-
force support obligations. All but one of the cases were heard by a
single judge during a four-day period. An assembly line hearing
was held in which approximately 250 nonsupport contempt mo-
tions were filed by the assistant state attorney; each hearing lasted
144. See Tetro v. Tetro, 544 P.2d 17 (Wash. 1975); Ferris v. State ex rel. Maass, 249
N.W.2d 789 (Wis. 1977); Brotzman v. Brotzman, 283 N.W.2d 600 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979).
145. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
[Rleason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary system of
criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer,
cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to us
to be an obvious truth. Governments, both state and federal, quite properly spend
vast sums of money to establish machinery to try defendants accused of crime.
Lawyers to prosecute are everywhere deemed essential to protect the public's in-
terest in an orderly society. Similarly, there are few defendants charged with
crime, few indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers they can get to prepare and
present their defenses. That government hires lawyers to prosecute and defen-
dants who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of
the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries.
The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental
and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours. From the very be-
ginning, our state and national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on
procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impar-
tial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law. This noble
ideal cannot be realized if the poor man charged with crime has to face his accus-
ers without a lawyer to assist him.
Id. at 344.
There is currently legislation before both the United States and Florida legislatures which
seeks to establish income withholding procedures for the enforcement of child support obli-
gations. H.R. 4325, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. (1984); Fla. HCS for HB 114 & HB 158 (1984). The
Florida bill, which parallels the federal legislation in many respects, directs the circuits to
establish central depositories to collect and monitor the support obligations. Furthermore, if
the obligations are not satisfied, the depository is directed to enforce them through an in-
come deduction served upon the obligor's employers. In addition, if the income deduction is
not effective for some reason, HRS is authorized to initiate contempt proceedings against
the obligor. Id.
The state is developing an elaborate collection and enforcement mechanism while over-
looking procedural protections for the obligor. HRS will have an investigative staff and
skilled attorneys preparing its case, while the potential contemnor will face the court alone.
It was precisely such a situation which Justice Black addressed in Gideon.
146. 429 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).
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only a few minutes. The proceedings were conducted with, in the
words of the Third District Court of Appeal,
the total absence of such forms of legal process as oaths, court
reporters, witnesses, and rules of evidence. Not only did the trial
court accept unsworn statements as true, the court failed to make
certain that respondents were fully aware of the right to defend
and to mitigate the accusations against them through witnesses,
testimony, cross-examination, and objection. On the contrary,
some respondents were frustrated in their attempts to present ev-
idence. . . .The assembly line procedures . . . lost sight of con-
stitutional guarantees. 4
The district court of appeal reversed the judgment of the trial
court on due process grounds and remanded for new evidentiary
hearings. In addition, the court recognized that "it is probable that
counsel would have directed the court's attention to procedural
due process requirements and might have prevented the unwar-
ranted imposition of jail sentences upon indigent con-
temnors. .. 4 However, the court was prevented from consider-
ing the issue of appointment of counsel by the earlier supreme
court decision in Andrews.'4 e
The Robbins case indicates that in Florida the nonsupport pro-
ceeding is both "complex" and, at times, "subject to substantial
dispute."'150 It clearly forewarns that the risk of an erroneous dep-
rivation is real and that the conclusion of the court in Andrews,
that "the parent who is unable to acquire the funds necessary to
purge himself will not be subject to imprisonment,' 5' is wrong.
With the pressures mounting to enforce support obligations, this
risk can only be heightened. Furthermore, while the appellate
courts, as in Robbins, are an important safeguard of the contem-
nor's constitutional guarantees, there will not always be the aware-
ness nor the resources available to take advantage of such a pro-
cess. 52 The contemnor should be protected from such an ordeal,
147. Id. at 429.
148. Id.
149. Id. (citing Andrews v. Walton, 428 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1983)).
150. See supra text accompanying note 135.
151. 428 So. 2d at 666. See also Ponder v. Ponder, 438 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)
(contemnor sentenced to jail on insufficient evidence of ability to pay).
152. The appeals in Robbins were advanced by Legal Services of Greater Miami, Inc. In
1984 the Legal Services Corporation, a federal agency which funded various legal services
organizations, lost its independent federal funding. Now these organizations must derive
their revenues from Social Services Block Grants to the states. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT
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before it occurs, through the appointment of counsel.
3. The State's Interest
The state obviously has a compelling interest in ensuring that its
citizens receive family support. Enforcement of valid support or-
ders will relieve the state of the burden of providing aid to the
contemnor's family. 153 It is in the interest of both the public and
the courts to have these mandates obeyed. 164 However, these con-
cerns will be unaffected by the provision of counsel to the indigent
defendant. The defendant who claims indigency, but is actually
able to pay, will be relieved of his support obligations only in the
event of a technicality. The defendant who truly does not have the
ability to comply with the court's order will be unable to pay re-
gardless of whether he was represented by counsel. In the latter
case, counsel will merely ensure that the potential contemnor's
constitutional guarantees are upheld by assisting in the presenta-
tion of evidence as to his inability to pay, and assuring that trial
procedures comport with due process.
The major impact upon the state will be the cost of providing
counsel. Several courts have claimed that this added expense will
be substantial, 155 yet other commentators question this conclu-
sion."'6 The United States Supreme Court, however, has not been
hesitant to impose financially burdensome requirements on the
states where constitutionally required. 157 In short, "though the
State's pecuniary interest is legitimate, it is hardly significant
enough to overcome private interests as important as those
AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: FY 1985, at 5-145 (1984). As a
result, the amount of funds available for these organizations will be significantly reduced. In
addition, each state is free to allocate these block grants as it chooses among the various
social services agencies. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, MAJOR THEMES AND ADDI-
TIONAL BUDGET DETAILS: FISCAL YEAR 1984, at 130 (1983). As such, there is little guarantee
that the state will continue to fund the various legal servicei organizations so that they will
be able to provide adequate independent representation to indigents. The result is that the
state is now in a position to control both sides of the issue. It can establish elaborate en-
forcement mechanisms to bring contempt proceedings against the indigent and yet deny
him the opportunity to have counsel in those proceedings-both through judicial interpreta-
tions of the right to counsel and a reduction of funds available to those organizations which
would provide counsel for the indigent.
153. See supra note 73.
154. Young v. Whitworth, 522 F. Supp. 759, 763 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
155. Id.
156. See Note, supra note 124, at 306 n.81.
157. See, e.g., Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981) (state required to pay for blood group-
ing test of indigent defendant in paternity action); Bodie v. Connecticut, 403 U.S. 371 (1971)




Where the liberty interest is undiluted, the procedures utilized
must be heightened to protect that interest. The Court in Lassiter
recognized that this interest creates the presumption that an indi-
gent has the right to court-appointed counsel."' This presumption
was overcome in cases where the interest was less than that of the
ordinary citizen,160 or where the defendant's interest was not that
of his own physical freedom,' but it has thus far been held con-
trolling where the interest is undiluted and loss of individual free-
dom may result.
In the nonsupport hearing the potential contemnor's liberty in-
terest is jeopardized by procedures which may result in the errone-
ous deprivation of personal freedom. Proceedings which are con-
ducted in a manner similar to those in Robbins v. Robbins'62 have
been found to be violative of due process. Surely in that case the
court recognized that, in practice, the nature of the hearing
presents a serious risk to the contemnor's constitutional rights.
Therefore, it outlined the procedures that should be followed by
trial courts in conducting these hearings. 6 ' However, when the
state effectively initiates the proceedings and is represented by
counsel, while the potential contemnor stands alone in his defense,
there is little to insure that these procedures will be followed. The
state and its court system cannot be relied upon to protect the in-
dividual interests of the contemnor when the state is an interested
party in the proceedings. In fact, were it not for the actions of the
local legal services organization in Robbins, the issue would most
likely not have been presented to the court.
The state's interest in enforcing the support obligations will not
be hindered by the provision of counsel to the indigent contemnor.
A full and fair hearing will be the result. Those who are willfully
158. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 28 (1981). If the state's
financial interest in not providing counsel does not rise to the constitutional significance
necessary to overcome the private interest in having one's parental rights terminated, the
higher interest in individual freedom of the nonsupport contemnor must surely be enough to
outweigh the disputed impact upon the state's treasury.
159. Id. at 26-27.
160. See, e.g., Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471 (1972).
161. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 18.
162. 429 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).
163. Id. at 429-31.
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ignoring the court's orders will be held in contempt and those who
are unable to pay will be released, hopefully to better their
financial conditions so that they may soon be able to resume pay-
ments. The pecuniary interest of the state in not bearing the cost
of providing counsel was not allowed to rise to constitutional
dimensions in Lassiter, even though Mrs. Lassiter was not faced
with imprisonment. In the nonsupport contempt hearing where the
threat of imprisonment looms large, the cost can by no stretch of
the imagination exceed the significance which it bore in Lassiter.
Counsel must be provided the indigent contemnor to ensure that
his fundamental liberty interest is not overlooked by the state in
its zeal to enforce support obligations by the least costly method
available.
The Florida Supreme Court has a significant and dubious his-
tory of undervaluing the constitutional rights of this state's citi-
zens who are thrust into the judicial process. In Gideon v. Wain-
wright,"' the Florida court sought to limit the indigent's right to
counsel in criminal prosecutions to capital offenses. The Supreme
Court of the United States overturned the Florida court in a
broadly written opinion."6 5 Later, in State ex rel. Argersinger v.
Hamlin,161 the Florida court sought to limit the right to counsel in
cases of nonpetty offenses. Again, with sweeping language, the Su-
preme Court overruled the Florida court."6 7 By now, the message
should be clear that "no person may be imprisoned for any offense
. ..unless he was represented by counsel at his trial."'6 8
It is urged that the court review its decision in Andrews v. Wal-
ton before it is once again reversed by the United States Supreme
Court.
IV. CONCLUSION
The civil contempt law of the State of Florida is clearly in a
state of confusion. A return to the traditional distinctions between
civil and criminal contempt would clarify the issues involved and
the results which should be reached. This is not to say that the
courts should relax enforcement of support orders, but rather that
they should ensure that those orders are enforced under constitu-
164. 153 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1963).
165. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (Fla. 1963).
166. 236 So. 2d 442 (1970).
167. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
168. Id. at 37 (footnote omitted).
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tional guidelines. To do so, the courts should, when the purpose is
to coerce the defendant into compliance, conduct the proceedings
as ones for civil contempt. When the purpose is to punish for past
noncompliance, the courts should demand that such proceedings
be conducted according to the rules of criminal procedure. In no
instance may the court hold defendants in contempt in civil pro-
ceedings if they no longer have the ability to comply. In addition,
determinate sentences should be imposed only when the rules of
criminal procedure have been followed. In civil proceedings, inde-
terminate sentences should be the result. Furthermore, the court
should provide counsel to the indigent defendants in civil con-
tempt proceedings to ensure the potential contemnor is afforded
due process.

